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DISCIPLINING JUDGES FOR NONOFFICIAL CONDUCT:
A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE OF THE LAW
Robert J. Martineaut
States have made clear in recent years, through their con-
stitutions and judicial decisions, that judges may face
discipline for improper behavior that does not relate to of-
ficial judicial duties. In this article, the author explains
the logical and legal bases for sanctioning such nonofficial
conduct. Following an exhaustive listing of specific nonof-
ficial acts for which judges have been disciplined, the
author examines some questions about the propriety of
scrutinizing a judge's conduct off the bench.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable developments in judicial adminis-
tration during the past two decades has been the almost universal
adoption of procedures for disciplining judges to supplement the
traditional means of impeachment and address.' Some jurists and
commentators argue that, particularly as to federal judges,
discipline by any means other than impeachment interferes with
the independence necessary for the proper functioning of a
judicial system.2 The overwhelming majority view, however, is
t B.S., College of the Holy Cross, 1956; J.D., University of Chicago, 1959; Professor of
Law and Associate Dean, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This article is
based on remarks prepared for the Seventh National Conference for Judicial Conduct
Organizations, October 16, 1980, New Orleans, Louisiana. The assistance of the
Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations of the American Judicature Society and
Ms. Kathy Rodenberg, Class of 1983, University of Cincinnati College of Law, is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 1-2 (2d ed. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as TESITOR & SINKS]. For a succinct description of the procedures of
address and impeachment, see Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at JudicialDiscipline,
54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1977).
2. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Cir., 398 U.S. 74, 136, 140 (1970) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting); Battisti, An Independent Judiciary
or an Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711 (1975); Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979); Kurland, The Constitution and the
Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes From History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,667,698
(1969). See generally K. CORR & L. BERKSON, LITERATURE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
47-69 (1979).
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that an effective alternate means of discipline is necessary to pre-
serve public confidence in the judicial system and that judicial
independence is not sacrificed in the process.'
Particularly difficult problems arise when judicial discipline is
sought for conduct that is nonofficial.4 Clearly, what a judge does
in his official capacity, whether on or off the bench, is properly
subject to some type of review by a body charged with protecting
the public from official misconduct. The concept that the public
must also be protected from a judge's conduct that is nonofficial
- assuming it is always possible to distinguish the official and
nonofficial roles - is less obvious. Two recent cases illustrate the
different approaches taken by state courts reviewing the nonoffi-
cial conduct of judges. In In re Dalessandro,5 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania refused to discipline a judge for his intimate rela-
tionship with a woman to whom he was not married.6 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of In re Seraphim, 7 disci-
plined a judge, partly because of his sexual conduct toward
women who were strangers to him.'
This article examines the reasoning of the courts of Pennsyl-
vania, Wisconsin, and other states in cases dealing with disciplin-
ing judges for nonofficial conduct. A discussion of the legal bases
for reviewing such conduct leads to an enumeration of particular
nonofficial acts that have resulted in sanctions being taken
against judges by the state's disciplining body. Finally, the article
describes some problems that have arisen or may soon be encoun-
tered by the disciplining bodies and suggests guidelines for the
administration of judicial discipline.
II. THE LEGAL BASES FOR DISCIPLINING
NONOFFICIAL CONDUCT
3. K. CORR & L. BERKSON, LITERATURE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 19-45 (1979).
4. The term "nonofficial" was chosen to describe a judge's conduct that does not arise
from the performance of judicial duties. Such conduct could be performed by a person
who is not a judge and is improper, either because it would be improper for anyone to
do or is improper when done by a judge but would not be improper for others. Con-
duct of a criminal nature would fall into the first category; conduct that violates the
Code of Judicial Conduct would be included in the latter.
The choice of the adjective "nonofficial" to describe accurately the type of con-
duct that is the subject of this article was particularly difficult. A number of other
adjectives have been used to describe the same type of conduct, but all of them have
some deficiencies for the purposes of this article. "Nonjudicial was rejected because
it may be confused with unjudicial or injudicious; "off the bench" is not appropriate
because judges act in an official capacity off the bench as well as on the bench;
"private" is misleading because the conduct may be public; "personal" is too broad
because all conduct is, in one sense, personal in that it is done by the judge as an indi-
vidual.
5. 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979).
6. Id at 461-63, 397 A.2d at 758-59.
7. 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980).
8. Id at 501-03. 510, 294 N.W.2d at 494-95, 499.
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The ultimate reason for any type of judicial discipline is to
maintain public confidence in the judiciary2 The logic behind this
principle is simple: a legal system can function only as long as the
public accepts and abides by decisions rendered by the courts; the
public will accept and abide by these decisions only if it is con-
vinced that the judges are fair and impartial; anything that tends
to weaken that conviction should be avoided. In other words, jus-
tice must not only be done, but it must also appear to be done. For
this reason, judges are commanded to avoid not only actual impro-
priety but also the appearance of impropriety in all of their activi-
ties.1 0
This reasoning has served as the basis for the establishment
of various methods of judicial discipline that add to and are less
cumbersome than impeachment and address. The types of disci-
pline that may be imposed upon a judge are generally prescribed
by constitutional amendment or statute, which usually provide a
range of sanctions, in contrast to the impeachment process where
the only sanction is removal from office. In addition to removal,
other permissible sanctions are retirement, suspension, public
reprimand or censure, private reprimand or censure, imposition of
conditions or limitations on the performance of judicial duties,
imposition of a fine, or any combination of the above.11 With the
addition of the State of Washington in 1980,12 all states have now
adopted constitutional provisions authorizing a court or commis-
sion to discipline judges.1 3 Congress has adopted similar provi-
sions for the District of Columbia14 and the federal courts. 5 These
provisions also set forth the grounds for imposing discipline,16
which include to a large extent nonofficial conduct.
It is not surprising that states have recently undertaken to
regulate the personal conduct of judges. State courts previously
used their power over the admission and discipline of attorneys to
establish and enforce standards of personal conduct for
attorneys. 17 In fact, in states in which the courts did not have ex-
9. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 1. See generally Miller, Public Confidence in
the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 69, 70 (1970).
10. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2.
11. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 1, at 4-5, 44-46; see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT; Todd & Proctor, Burden of Proof,
Sanctions, and Confidentiality, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 183-89 (1977).
12. Judicial Conduct Reporter, Fall 1980, at 4, col. 1.
13. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 1, at 2, 12-18.
14. Id.
15. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2040 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1976)).
16. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 1, at 4, 40-43; Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline
in the Context of Judicial Disciplinary Commissions, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 59-61
(1977).
17. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974); Martineau,
The Authority of a State Supreme Court to Regulate Judicial Ethics, 15 ST. LOUIS
L.J. 237, 245-46 (1971); Note, Disbarment Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating
Unfitness to Practice, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 489, 492-93 (1958).
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press authority to discipline judges, their conduct was regulated
by virtue of their status as attorneys. The courts give as the basis
for regulating the conduct of attorneys the same argument as that
used for regulating judges: the preservation of public confidence
in the judicial process.
A. The Code of Judicial Conduct
Virtually all states have adopted a code of conduct that is
expressly or implicitly binding upon the judges of that state and
is enforced through a judicial discipline process. Most states have
adopted, with minor variations, the Code of Judicial Conduct 8
drafted in 1972 by the American Bar Association.19 The Code of
Judicial Conduct is the successor to the Canons of Judicial Ethics
prepared by the ABA in 1924. Developments in the late 1960's
indicated that the Canons, which were concerned primarily with
the performance of a judge's official duties, were no longer ade-
quate. The Canons were both too general and not sufficiently
directed at the nonofficial activities of judges. The Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, as ultimately approved by the ABA and as adopted
in most states, obviates both of these deficiencies.
Increased concern with the behavior of judges has centered
primarily in the area of their nonofficial conduct. This concern
anticipated somewhat the similar emphasis on ethics in govern-
ment and use of official power for personal advantage that
emerged from the Watergate era. There are as many explanations
for this change in emphasis as there are persons who attempt to
analyze it. Certainly one major factor is the rapidly expanding
power of the judiciary over the lives of the average citizens, partic-
ularly over those who are affected by judgments and decrees
entered by a judge. As judicial power has expanded, so has the
concern over the judges who exercise that power and their per-
sonal interests that may affect their decisions. Although all of
these concerns are not necessarily justified, and interest in a
judge's personal life may sometimes be unwarranted, it is clear
that the emphasis in the Code of Judicial Conduct is on the nonof-
ficial behavior of judges rather than on their official actions.
The extent to which the Code is concerned with the nonofficial
activities of judges is best demonstrated by analyzing each canon
of the Code seriatim. The Code contains seven canons, each di-
vided into a general principle, an accompanying text setting forth
specific rules, and a commentary. A reading of the Code shows
18. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct is set out in full in the Appendix.
19. There is no current data on the number of states that have adopted the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct. In 1975 it was reported that 39 states and the United States Judi-
cial Conference had adopted it in whole or in part. Special Committee to Obtain Adop-
tion of the Code of Judicial Conduc 100 A.B.A. REP. 859-60 (1975). Several addi-
tional states have subsequently adopted it.
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that, of the seven canons, only Canon Three is concerned exclu-
sively with judicial activities, 0 while Canon One is very general
and applies to both official and nonofficial activities. 21 The remain-
ing five canons deal with nonofficial conduct. 22 This emphasis
reflects the fact that the problems that gave rise to demands for
revision of the Canons of Judicial Ethics concerned nonofficial
rather than official activities.
3
B. The Power to Discipline
California, the first state to create a commission with investi-
gatory and adjudicatory powers over judicial conduct, constitu-
tionally provides that a judge may be disciplined for action that
"constitutes willful misconduct in office, persistent failure or in-
ability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the
use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. '24
The last ground provides the basis for judicial discipline for nonof-
ficial conduct. Twenty-eight states have constitutional provisions
similar to California's, authorizing judicial discipline for behavior
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute.25 Further, twenty states authorize judicial
discipline for violations of the state's code of judicial conduct.
26
Additionally, thirty-two states authorize judicial discipline for
habitual intemperance,27 twenty-three for a felony conviction, 28
and twenty-one for an offense involving moral turpitude.29 Each of
these grounds potentially includes conduct that is nonofficial.
Thus, a majority of states expressly permit a judge to be disci-
plined for his conduct as a private citizen.
C. Judicial Opinions
Perhaps even more important than the provisions of state
constitutions and of the Code of Judicial Conduct are the deci-
20. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3.
21. See id. CANON 1.
22. See id. CANONS 2, 4-7.
23. The authors of the Code divided the activities of a judge into three spheres: judicial,
quasi-judicial, and extra-judicial. Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial
Conduc 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793, 796 (1972). For purposes of this article, however,
the official/nonofficial division is more appropriate. For an analysis of the effect of
the Code of Judicial Conduct on the nonofficial conduct of judges, see Volcansek,
Codes of Judicial Ethics: Do They Affect Judges' Views of Proper Off-the-Bench
Behavior?, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 493 (1980).
24. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(c).
25. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 1, at 4, 40-43.





sions of state courts establishing general principles to govern the
relationship between judicial discipline and nonofficial conduct.
With one exception,30 these opinions are of rather recent origin,
reflecting the fact that only in the past two decades have state
courts been given express constitutional authority to discipline
judges. Prior to this development, few occasions arose for state
courts to consider the relationship.',
A close examination of the language used by courts faced with
the question of whether to subject a judge to punishment because
of his conduct is extremely important for two reasons. First, there
are so few opinions written on the subject that the language
adopted in these decisions provides the only judicial gloss avail-
able to the rules of ethics for judges. Second, a comparison of the
opinions shows striking similarities and patterns in the rationales
adopted by most of the courts imposing discipline for a judge's
nonofficial conduct.
Louisiana is the only state in which the highest court has long
possessed express disciplinary authority over judges. 32 In Stanley
v. Jones,33 decided in 1942, the court ordered the removal of a
judge for misconduct. The opinion addressed the relationship
between judicial discipline and nonofficial conduct in the following
terms:
The record discloses beyond question, we think, that the
defendant has been guilty not only of official misconduct
but of gross misconduct not connected with his office -
30. Stanley v. Jones, 201 La. 549, 9 So. 2d 678 (1942).
31. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
AND INTERIM REPORT (June 1970); see Cameron, The Inherent Power of a State's
Highest Court to Discipline the Judiciary, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45 (1977); Martineau,
The Authority of a State Supreme Court to Regulate Judicial Ethics, 15 ST. LOUIS
L.J. 237 (1971). One occasion in which a court did comment on the special status of a
judge was In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927), in which the court dis-
barred an attorney, a former judge, on the basis of his conduct while on the bench.
The court stated:
The respondent knew that his position as judge carried with it a limitation
upon his freedom of action not imposed upon the ordinary practicing attor-
ney. There are many things which he might do with propriety as a practicing
attorney which would be highly improper while occupying a judicial position.
One sitting as a judge who voluntarily places himself under obligation to
the criminal element of his judicial district, even though that obligation be
merely that of debtor and creditor, and who sits in judgment upon the case
of his debtor, shocks the public confidence in his court and tends to bring the
general administration of justice into disrepute. This is the nature of respon-
dent's offense.
Respondent's offense is one against the administration of justice. His
offense has brought courts and the administration of justice into disrepute.
Id at 619-23, 214 N.W. at 385-86.
32. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1921, amended 1974).
33. 201 La. 549, 9 So. 2d 678 (1942).
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such misconduct, indeed, as makes it necessary that he be
removed from office.
The record shows that he has been guilty of acts...
which reflect such serious defects in his character as to
render him utterly unfit to perform the delicate and im-
portant functions of the office which he holds.
The office of judge is one in which the general public
has a deep and vital interest, and, because that is true, the
official conduct of judges, as well as their private conduct,
is closely observed. When a judge, either in his official
capacity or as a private citizen, is guilty of such conduct
as to cause others to question his character and morals,
the people not only lose respect for him as a man but lose
respect for the court over which he presides as well.1
The validity of these statements is evidenced by the fact that they
continue to be quoted with approval by the Louisiana Supreme
Court." Recently, this language was also used by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in the case of In re Seraphim.
36
The Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the theme of protect-
ing the integrity of the judicial office in its 1977 decision, In re
Babineaux.37 Ruling to suspend without pay seven judges until
they resigned as directors of business or financial institutions
affected with the public interest, the court stated:
Judges are not merely elected public officials. Their role in
the administration of justice makes them a special breed.
The administration of justice requires adherence by the
judiciary to the highest ideals of personal and official con-
duct. If judges openly flaunt the legal and constitution-
ally sanctioned and adopted Canons of the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, there is no question but that such persistent
and public conduct is prejudicial to the administration of
justice and that it does bring the judicial office into dis-
repute.
38
Even though the court found the judges' performances on the
bench to be exemplary,3 9 it decided that violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct was enough to necessitate discipline.
While the Louisiana court in Babineaux was not required to
find that the judges' conduct "related to" their official duties,' 0 it
earlier held in another case4' that personal-conduct ofa _Jcge in-
34. Id at 562-63, 9 So. 2d at 683.
35. See State v. O'Hara, 252 La. 540, 558-59, 211 So. 2d 641, 648 (1968).
36. 97 Wis. 2d 485, 510, 294 N.W. 2d 485, 499 (1980) (quoting State v. O'Hara, 252 La.
540, 558-59, 211 So. 2d 641, 648 (1968)).
37. 346 So. 2d 676 (La. 1977).
38. Id. at 681.
39. See id
40. I at 680-81.
41. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1. 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
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volving violation of criminal laws regulating gambling and por-
nography does "relate to" the judicial office.4 2 In its decision, In re
Haggerty,43 the court found the judge's public misconduct off the
bench to be "so seriously delinquent as to bring disgrace and
discredit upon the judicial office and a loss of public respect and
confidence in his ability to perform his official duties impartially
and conscientiously."" Because the judge participated in
activities that violated the criminal laws that the judge was sworn
to uphold, the court reasoned that the misconduct related to the
judge's official duties.
In addition to the courts of Louisiana and Wisconsin, courts
in six other jurisdictions have wrestled with the question of
whether a judge should be disciplined for misconduct in nonoffi-
cial activities. With one exception, 4 these courts have answered
the question affirmatively. In most cases, the reasoning behind
the decision to discipline a judge for nonofficial conduct has been
that such conduct detrimentally affects the public's confidence in
the integrity of the judge and, ultimately, in the judicial process.
For this reason, judges are held to a higher standard of conduct
than ordinary citizens or even other members of the bar.
This standard was applied by the Ohio Supreme Court in Cin-
cinnati Bar Association v. Heitzler, 46 where the court stated:
[A] judge is charged with the responsibility of conforming
to a higher standard of personal behavior than the ordi-
nary person. A judge's conduct of personal behavior must
be "beyond reproach." Improper conduct which may be
overlooked when committed by the ordinary person, or
even a lawyer, cannot be overlooked when committed by a
judge. By accepting his office, a judge undertakes to con-
duct himself in both his official and personal behavior in
accordance with the highest standard that society can
expect.
7
42. Id at 39-40, 241 So. 2d at 482. The judge in Haggerty was disciplined under the 1921
Louisiana Constitution, which allowed a judge to be disciplined only for "wilful mis-
conduct relating to his official duty or wilful and persistent failure to perform his
duty, or for habitual intemperance, or for conviction, while in office, of a felony." LA.
CONST. of 1921, art. IX, § 4(B) (1968). The judges in Babineaux were subject to the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which reflected the state's desire to circumscribe
nonofficial conduct of judges: "[T]he supreme court may censure, suspend with or
without salary, remove from office, or retire involuntarily a judge for willful miscon-
duct relating to his official duty, [or] persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute .... LA. CONST.
art. V, § 25(c) (emphasis added). Because of the alternative basis for discipline in the
new constitution, the Babineaux court was not required to rule that the judges' con-
duct "related to" their official duties, as did the court in Haggerty.
43. 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
44. Id. at 39-40, 241 So. 2d at 482 (quoting with approval the opinion of the Judiciary
Commission of Louisiana).
45. In re Dalessandro, 583 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979).
46. 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).
47. Id at 221, 291 N.E.2d at 482.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has twice con-
sidered this same question. In the first case, In re Troy, 4 the court
declared:
It is to be remembered that [judges'] service and its qual-
ity are to be gauged not only by their scholarship in the
law and wisdom in its application but in the conduct of
their personal affairs, the prudence in their public utter-
ances .... and in their strict adherence to the Code of Judi-
cial Ethics to which they all are now subject.
... Unquestionably a judge is entitled to lead his own
private life free from unwarranted intrusion. But even
there, subjected as he is to constant public scrutiny in his
community and beyond, he must adhere to standards of
probity and propriety higher than those deemed accepta-
ble for others. More is expected of him and, since he is a
judge, rightfully so.
49
In a subsequent case, In re Morrissey,50 the Massachusetts court
found that although the judge had not engaged in any illegal or
corrupt acts, he showed indifference to the then controlling
Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required that a judge's personal
actions be beyond reproach. In justifying the high standards
imposed on judges, the court stated:
That the standards imposed on judges are high goes
without saying. Because of the great power and respon-
sibility judges have in passing judgment on their fellow
citizens, such standards are desirable and necessary and
there should be strict adherence to them. Failure on the
part of even a few judges to comply with these standards
serves to degrade and demean the entire judiciary and to
erode public confidence in the judicial process. Anyone
who is unwilling to accept and abide by such stringent
rules of conduct should not aspire to or accept the great
honor and the grave responsibility of serving on the
bench.51
The Supreme Court of Vermont has similarly recognized and
enforced higher standards of personal conduct for judges. Its
opinion in In re Douglas52 noted that members of the judiciary are
and must be held to stringent standards of conduct due to the
"extraordinary responsibility of judicial office .... The Canons of
Judicial Conduct are standards measuring fitness for judicial
office and therefore embrace tests of behavior relating to integrity
48. 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973).
49. Id, at 71, 306 N.E.2d at 234-35.
50. 366 Mass. 11, 313 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
51. Id. at 16-17, 313 N.E.2d at 881-82 (footnote omitted).
52. 135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215 (1977).
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and propriety that condemn actions in which the average citizen
can freely indulge without consequence.""
Reviewing a judge's involvement in a political campaign, the
Supreme Court of Michigan wrote:
We believe that [the judge's] conduct in this connection
could only result in diminished public confidence in the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary and that it
constitutes conduct clearly prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice.
The point, then, as also reflected in our judicial
canons and opinions dealing with other judicial miscon-
duct cases, is that a judge, whether on or off the bench, is
bound to strive toward creating and preserving the image
of the justice system as an independent, impartial source
of reasoned actions and decisions. Achievement of this
goal demands that a judge, in a sense, behave as though
he is always on the bench.54
The New York Court of Appeals, in two 1980 decisions, ex-
pressed a similar viewpoint. In Kuehnel v. State Commission on
Judicial Conduct, 55 the court noted that the judge
fail[ed] to comprehend the basic maxim that a Judge may
not so facilely divorce behavior off the Bench from the
judicial function. Standards of conduct on a plane much
higher than for those of society as a whole, must be
observed by judicial officers so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary will be preserved. A Judge
must conduct his everyday affairs in a manner beyond
reproach. Any conduct, on or off the Bench, inconsistent
with proper judicial demeanor subjects the judiciary as a
whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the in-
dividual Judge to carry out his or her constitutionally
mandated function.5 6
Another case decided by the same court, In re Steinberg,57
employed similar language:
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, a Judge cannot sim-
ply cordon off his public role from his private life and
assume safely that the former will have no impact upon
the latter .... Wherever he travels, a Judge carries the
mantle of his esteemed office with him, and, conse-
quently, he must always be sensitive to the fact that
53. Id. at 592, 382 A.2d at 219.
54. In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 195, 267 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1978).
55. 49 N.Y.2d 465, 403 N.E.2d 167, 426 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1980).
56. Id at 469, 403 N.E.2d at 168, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
57. 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1980).
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members of the public, including some of his friends, will
regard his words and actions with heightened deference
simply because he is a Judge.
[W]e cannot accept his further contention that con-
duct off the Bench may give rise to removal only when
there has been some act of overt illegality or extreme
"moral turpitude". We see no sound reason to distinguish
between conduct "on the Bench" and conduct "off the
Bench" for present purposes, since "[a]ny conduct, on or
off the Bench, inconsistent with proper judicial demeanor
subjects the judiciary as a whole to disrespect and im-
pairs the usefulness of the individual Judge to carry out
his or her constitutionally mandated function." 58
With its decisions in Kuehnel and Steinberg, the highest court
in New York agreed with the position of other state courts that a
judge may be disciplined for nonofficial conduct. These decisions,
like those of Louisiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Massachusetts, Ver-
mont, and Michigan, reflect the courts' emphasis on the need to
maintain public confidence in the judicial system. Without such
confidence, the system cannot function effectively. Because a
judge's official and nonofficial conduct affects the public's confi-
dence in the judiciary, a judge must always abide by the highest
standards.
In only one state, Pennsylvania, has the highest court held
that discipline may be based only upon conduct performed in a
judge's official capacity. Deciding In re Dalessandro,59 the court
considered the recommendation of the Pennsylvania Judicial
Inquiry and Review Board that a judge be publicly censured for a
number of actions, some of which involved only nonofficial con-
duct. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a judge may be disci-
plined for various reasons, including conduct that brings the judi-
cial office into disrepute or that violates canons of judicial ethics
adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 60 In a per curiam
opinion joined in by only two of seven justices,6' the court held
that a judge was subject to discipline only for official conduct and
not for personal conduct that was not otherwise illegal. The court
noted that the constitutional provisions and the Code of Judicial
58. Id. at 81, 83-84, 409 N.E.2d at 1382, 1384, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 707,709 (citation omitted)
(quoting Kuehnel v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 49 N.Y.2d 465, 469, 403
N.E.2d 167, 168, 426 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1980)).
59. 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979) (per curiam).
60. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d).
61. Of the seven judges to hear the case, one concurred in the result, two filed dissenting
opinions, and two did not participate in the consideration or decision. In re Dalessan-
dro, 483 Pa. 431, 466, 397 A.2d 743, 760 (1979).
19811
Conduct are concerned with "(1) the conduct of a judge acting in
an official capacity (2) any other conduct which affects the judge
while acting in an official capacity, and (3) conduct prohibited by
law."'6 2 Working from this basis, the court continued:
To read into the constitution or the canons prohibi-
tions which go beyond the above categories is to enter a
most precarious area of inquiry for the state - the realm
in which private moral beliefs are enforced and private
notions of acceptable social conduct are treated as law.
Standards in these private areas are constantly evolving
and escape, at any given moment, precise definition. Con-
duct of a judge or any public official which may be offen-
sive to the personal sensitivities of a segment of the soci-
ety is properly judged in the privacy of the ballot box .
Thus, it can be seen that there are, in effect, two tri-
bunals wherein judgments must be made concerning the
conduct of a judge. For some matters that tribunal is prop-
erly the people through the ballot box. This Court as the
other tribunal can only be concerned with conduct which
as previously noted involves a judge acting in his official
capacity or conduct which affects the judge acting in an
official capacity or conduct prohibited by law.
63
Chief Justice Eagen wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
referred to the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct that
require a judge to avoid impropriety or the appearance of impro-
priety and the constitutional provision that permits judicial disci-
pline for conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute. He
said that "[tjo read these rules of conduct as restricted to activi-
ties while a judge is clothed in a robe or 'acting in his or her official
capacity' is pure sophistry.
' 6
4
In summary, the highest courts in eight states have discussed
the relationship between a judge's nonofficial conduct and judicial
discipline. Of these eight, seven have declared in forceful terms
that what a judge does in his personal life has an impact upon the
performance of his judicial duties and upon public confidence in
the judicial process, and that, because of this, it is proper to base
discipline on nonofficial conduct. Pennsylvania, the only state
exhibiting a contrary view, did so in an opinion concurred in by
only two members of a seven-member court.
62. Id. at 460, 397 A.2d at 757.
63. Id. at 460-61, 397 A.2d at 757-58.
64. Id. at 466, 397 A.2d at 760 (Eagen, C.J., dissenting).
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The objections of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to disci-
plining nonofficial conduct were that the Code of Judicial Conduct
is concerned with official conduct and that the ballot box is the
place to review nonofficial conduct.65 Neither of these objections
appears valid. The Code of Judicial Conduct, as pointed out
earlier, is primarily concerned with nonofficial rather than official
conduct.6 6 In Canon Two, the text and the commentary expressly
refer to all of a judge's activities, not only his official duties, as
being within the purview of the Code.6 7 Reliance on the elective
system to enforce proper standards of judicial conduct is also ill-
founded. An election does not prove that a judge has acted prop-
erly or improperly or that his conduct has or has not been prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice; it only means that the judge
received enough votes to win the election. This could be the result
of any number of factors unrelated to the prior conduct of the
judge, such as an absence of other candidates; a multitude of
worse candidates; several highly qualified candidates splitting a
majority of the votes thereby allowing a less qualified judge to
receive a plurality; other issues seeming more important than a
judge's record; and a judge spending more money, employing a
better campaign manager, or being supported by a special interest
group. Furthermore, public confidence in the judicial system
entails confidence not only on the part of the participants in a
judicial election, but also by others who may be affected directly
or indirectly by judicial decisions. This may well include many per-
sons not eligible to participate in the election of a judge.
III. SPECIFIC CONDUCT
During the past decade, state courts have decided many cases
in which they considered whether to impose sanctions upon a
judge for specific types of nonofficial conduct. An examination of
these cases illustrates the different types of nonofficial conduct
that have warranted disciplinary action.6 In few of these cases is
the specific conduct listed below the only misconduct with which
the judge was charged. Usually an allegation of nonofficial mis-
65. Id. at 460, 397 A.2d at 757.
66. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
67. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2.
68. The cases through 1978 are collected in JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY DIGEST (J.
Rosenbaum ed.), published in 1981 by the American Judicature Society. The author
is indebted to the Society for making a preliminary draft of the DIGEST available for
use in the preparation of this article.
The cases may be grouped under several headings based upon the general nature
of the conduct involved. These groupings, based upon those used in the DIGEST, Will
be used for the purpose of setting forth the factual situations and analysis.
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conduct involves repeated misconduct or is joined with allega-
tions of official misconduct.69 Consequently, specific acts are con-
sidered as part of a pattern of conduct, rather than individually.
Several courts have held that, although individual acts considered
separately may not justify discipline, the cumulative effect of all
of the acts may support the imposition of sanctions.70 Each act
described below, either standing alone or in conjunction with
other acts, has been found to be a ground for ruling that a judge
should be disciplined.
A. Use of Public Property
The improper use of public property has elements of both offi-
cial and nonofficial conduct because the opportunity arises only
due to the judge's official position. It is classified here as nonoffi-
cial, however, because the actions do not relate to the performance
of a judge's official duties but rather to the use of the position to
aid a judge's private interests. Judges have been disciplined for
the following conduct: (1) conducting a personal investigation of
local officials using the judge's office and telephone and county
employee; 71 (2) charging to or seeking from a public agency reim-
bursement for personal travel;72 (3) using county funds to pay for a
personal attorney; 73 (4) using a court employee to work on the
judge's personal projects;74 and (5) assisting another person to
obtain county funds improperly.
75
B. Speech and Associations
A substantial number of judges have been disciplined for their
speech and associations with others. Judges have argued that
these activities are protected by the guarantees of the first
amendment, but no court has accepted this argument. The Su-
preme Court of Kansas addressed the question directly in one
case, in the following language:
In taking his office a judge assumes added responsibili-
ties and is held to a-higher standard of conduct than the
lay person. For a judge the right to speak freely is circum-
scribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the
69. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1978);
In re Welch, 283 Md. 68, 73, 388 A.2d 535, 538 (1978); In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485,
513, 294 N.W.2d 485, 500 (1980).
70. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1978); In re
Welch, 283 Md. 68, 73, 388 A.2d 535, 538 (1978); In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 513,
294 N.W.2d 485, 500 (1980).
71. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978).
72. Strickland v. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 388 So. 2d 1202 (Ala. 1980); In re La Motte, 341
So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977).
73. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Funderburk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973).
74. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E,2d 203 (1973).
75. In re Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1976).
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lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibil-
ity, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge
from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.7
6
Judges have been disciplined for improper language, such as:
(1) using abusive language to a county employee in a non-court
matter;77 (2) using abusive language to lawyers and court employ-
ees;7 (3) using vulgar and threatening language to a member of
the news media; 9 and (4) engaging in verbal (and physical) attacks
on adolescents. 0 Sanctions have been levelled against judges for
their improper criticism of others: (1) making a public speech
accusing several persons of improper conduct;8' (2) publicly criti-
cizing a prosecutor or public defender; 2 (3) making disparaging
remarks in public about other judges;8 3 and (4) sending copies of
letters critical of an attorney to the attorney's clients . 4 Other
speech for which judges have been disciplined include: (1) volun-
tarily testifying as a character witness for a person previously
convicted by the judge;8' and (2) mounting a publicity campaign to
abort a disciplinary proceeding against the judge.
6
Association with criminals has provided the basis for disci-
plining judges: (1) meeting with an escaped convict without turn-
ing him over to authorities;7 and (2) maintaining a close and inti-
mate association with a known felon 8 Other types of association
leading to discipline have included: (1) attending a meeting where
a matter discussed was likely to come before the judge;8 9 (2) keep-
ing a close social relationship with a bondsman writing bonds in
the judge's court;90 (3) participating in 9l or contributing to 92 a can-
didate's campaign for office; (4) being a guest at a lunch of persons
76. In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 205, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (1975).
77. Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122
Cal. Rptr. 788 (1975).
78. In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978).
79. In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977).
80. Kuehnel v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 49 N.Y.2d 465, 403 N.E.2d 167, 426
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1980).
81. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978).
82. In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Mayer,
54 Ohio St. 2d 431, 377 N.E.2d 770 (1978).
83. In re Sobel, 8 N.Y.2d (a), (h), 409 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Court on Judiciary 1960); Ohio State
Bar Ass'n v. Mayer, 54 Ohio St. 2d 431, 377 N.E.2d 770 (1978).
84. In re Heverman, 90 S.D. 312, 240 N.W.2d 603 (1976).
85. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978).
86. In re Terry, 262 Ind. 667, 323 N.E.2d 192 (1975).
87. In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1972).
88. Gremillion v. O'Hara, 252 La. 540, 211 So. 2d 641 (1968).
89. In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978).
90. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973); In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 279
N.E.2d 296 (1972).
91. In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978); In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270
(Mo. 1980).
92. In re Larkin, 333 N.E.2d 199 (Mass. 1975); In re Briggs, 595, S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1980).
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regularly appearing before the court;93 and (5) accepting proceeds
of a testimonial dinner given by attorneys in the judge's honor.
9
4
C. Interfering With or Seeking to Influence Litigation or
Administrative Proceedings Not Pending Before the Judge
Judges have on occasion attempted to interfere with or influ-
ence on behalf of themselves or others litigation pending before
other judges. This is of course improper, whether done by a judge
or anyone else. Judges, however, have a greater opportunity to
exercise influence because of their easier access to other judges
and a greater incentive to use their influence because of the possi-
bility that it may be successful. Sometimes a judge is disciplined
for attempting to help a friend, such as: (1) making an inquiry of a
grand jury investigator as to the likelihood of a friend of the judge
being indicted by the grand jury;95 (2) requesting another judge to
dismiss a traffic citation received by the judge or a friend;96 (3)
arranging for special handling of a friend who was a complaining
witness in a case, attempting to persuade the defendant to plead
guilty, attempting to influence assignment of the case, and
attending the trial and staring at the defendant;97 (4) writing a let-
ter on court stationery urging an administrative agency to recon-
sider denial of a license to a friend of the judge;98 (5) becoming in-
volved in a criminal case, in which a friend was the defendant, by
interviewing the prosecuting witness while wearing judicial robes
and arranging for a disposition of the charges; 99 and (6) attempt-
ing to expedite the processing of a friend's license application.100
Other times, a judge's self-serving conduct requires discipline.
For example: (1) sending letters to appellate judges about action
taken in a case prior to any appellate review of the action;101 (2)
asking a federal prosecutor whether a criminal complaint had been
filed against a potential defendant and accepting payment for this
action;102 and (3) seeking to influence, directly and through
another person, processing and disposition of a case. 103
93. In re D'Auria, 67 N.J. 22, 334 A.2d 332 (1975).
94. In re Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975).
95. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975).
96. Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 773, 532 P.2d 1209,
119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975); In re Miller, 223 Kan. 130, 572 P.2d 896 (1977); In re
Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 308 A.2d 1 (1973); In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367
(1978).
97. In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977).
98. In re Anastasi, 76 N.J. 510, 388 A.2d 620 (1978).
99. In re Maidman, 42 A.D.2d 44, 345 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1973).
100. Lonschein v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 569, 408 N.E.2d 901, 430
N.Y.S.2d 571 (1980).
101. In re Emmet, 293 Ala. 143, 300 So. 2d 435 (1974).
102. In re Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11, 313 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
103. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1971).
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D. Sexual Conduct
The problems involved in holding judges to a standard of per-
sonal conduct higher than that of other persons are particularly
difficult with regard to sexual conduct. Although the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that sexual conduct, whether pri-
vate or notorious, is beyond the scope of judicial discipline, 0 4 four
other courts have held to the contrary. The specific acts that
courts have found to justify a finding of misconduct are: (1) engag-
ing in sexual acts in an automobile in a public parking lot with a
woman to whom the judge was not married;1 0 5 (2) bringing porno-
graphic movies and prostitutes to a stag party;10 (3) taking trips
with a woman to whom the judge was not married and acting in a
manner that led others to believe the judge was living with the
woman; 0 17 and (4) committing "unprivileged and nonconsensual
physical contact with offensive sexual overtones against several
women." 08
E. Involvement in Business Activities
Judges are often engaged in business activities of their own or
in aiding those of others. In a number of cases, this involvement
has resulted in the imposition of judicial discipline. Courts have
held the following acts to be improper: (1) serving as a director of a
business corporation; 1°9 (2) serving as auctioneer for estates that
were being administered in the judge's court;" 0 (3) violating terms
of a business license;"' (4) devoting substantial time each day to
private business;112 (5) obtaining a real estate broker's license;113 (6)
permitting a loan company, on whose board the judge served, to
use in a brochure the picture and name of the judge;1 4 (7) using
official title and stationery in seeking a zoning change for prop-
erty in which the judge had an interest;1 5 (8) acting as a loan
broker for friends;" 6 and (9) accepting a favorable car rental
arrangement from a local car dealer before and after the dealer
appeared before the judge in court as a litigant."7
104. In re Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979).
105. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Lee), 336 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1976).
106. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
107. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).
108. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 495, 294 N.W.2d 485, 503 (1980).
109. In re Babineaux, 346 So. 2d 676 (La. 1977); Babineaux v. Judiciary Comm'n, 341 So.
2d 396 (La. 1976).
110. In re Welch, 283 Md. 68, 388 A.2d 535 (1978).
111. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973).
112. Id
113. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1971).
114. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).
115. In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974).
116. In re Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1980).
117. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980).
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F. Miscellaneous
Activities for which judges have been disciplined that do not
fall into any of the above categories include: (1) filing false federal
income tax returns;1 ' (2) assisting and directing law enforcement
officials in making arrests;" 9 (3) borrowing money from attorneys
who practice in the judge's district;20 (4) practicing law;'2 (5) fail-
ing to file a fully completed financial disclosure form;'22 and (6)
becoming a candidate for nonjudicial office.
123
IV. PROBLEM AREAS
Although it is clear that in a majority of jurisdictions in which
the issue has arisen judges may be disciplined for their nonofficial
conduct, several issues involved in so doing require additional at-
tention and discussion. The first and most basic issue is whether a
nexus exists between the private life of a judge and public con-
fidence in the judiciary and, if so, whether the nexus justifies set-
ting limitations on the former in order to protect the latter. Both
courts 124 and commentators 125 have premised the imposition and
enforcement of standards of personal conduct for judges on the
need to protect public confidence in the judicial process. While a
judge's private behavior and the public's confidence in the
judiciary have a facial relationship, no scientific or statistical data
supports any direct correlation between the two. Unless this cor-
relation has been demonstrated, it is questionable as to whether
restrictions upon the personal conduct of judges are justified.
The Florida Supreme Court has taken the position that a
judge may be disciplined for personal misconduct without proof
that such actions caused loss of public confidence. In In re La
Motte,126 the court stated:
In determining whether a judge has conducted him-
self in a manner which erodes public confidence in the
judiciary, we must consider the act or wrong itself and not
the resulting adverse publicity.... [11f a judge commits a
grievous wrong which should erode public confidence in
118. In re Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1980).
119. West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Comm'n v. Dostert, 271 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1980).
120. In re Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 1977).
121. In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 232 N.W.2d 178 (1975); In re Piper, 271 Or. 726, 534 P.2d
159 (1975).
122. In re Kading, 74 Wis. 2d 405, 246 N.W.2d 903 (1976).
123. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Schamel, 46 A.D.2d
236, 362 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1974).
124. See text accompanying notes 32-58 supra
125. Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 70 (1970); Rifkind, A Judge's Nonjudicial Behavior, 38 N.Y. ST. B.J.
22, 22-23 (1966); Rifkind, The Public Concern in a Judge's Private Life, in UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 25, 26-28 (1964).
126. 341 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977).
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the judiciary, but it does not appear that the public has
lost confidence in the judiciary, the judge should never-
theless be removed.
127
The Florida court failed to explain by what process it is deter-
mined that certain conduct should cause a loss of confidence in the
judiciary. Because it made no reference to any other standard,
the court in La Motte appears to be saying that whatever conduct
the disciplinary body thinks should cause the public to lose confi-
dence in the judiciary may be proscribed. Thus, a court may pro-
hibit whatever conduct it determines is inappropriate for judges.
While it may be within the power of the courts to exercise control
over judges in this manner, the court in La Motte would have been
more candid by acknowledging that it was actually enforcing its
own standards and not those of the public.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted a better
approach to disciplining judges for nonofficial conduct. That court
employs a "reasonable person" standard for determining the
effect of a judge's conduct upon the public. 128 While such a test is
not completely objective, it is better than a totally subjective one.
The reasonable person standard has long been used in other legal
contexts, such as torts, and is a familiar standard to judges facing
discipline as well as to the courts considering disciplinary
measures. Because the reasonable person standard is well-known
to most courts and judges, and because it is intended to reflect
public reaction to a judge's nonofficial conduct, the use of this
standard would better promote the basis for disciplining a judge
for nonofficial conduct: maintaining public confidence in and
respect for the judicial system.
Several courts have had to face the problem of whether disci-
pline may be based on the judge's conduct prior to the time he
assumed office. The American Bar Association Standards
Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement ex-
pressly state that a judge should be subject to discipline for prior
conduct.129 Courts that have considered the problem have also con-
cluded that if personal conduct is to be considered, it does not
make any difference whether such conduct occurred before or
after a person becomes a judge. 3 0 The rationale is that the judicial
127. Id at 518 (emphasis added).
128. In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 469, 318 A.2d 523, 533 (1974).
129. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT
3.1.
130. In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 642, 232 N.W.2d 178, 179 (1975); In re Gilard, 271
N.W.2d 785, 813 (Minn. 1978); cf In re Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105, 110-11 (Tex. 1976)
("IThe public, as the ultimate judge and jury in a democratic society, can choose to
forgive the misconduct of an elected public official if the public knows about such
misconduct prior to the election."). The court in Carrilo held that because the peti-
tioner's acts of misconduct were concealed from the public, his reelection as district
judge was not a showing of forgiveness by the electorate. The court, therefore,
ordered the removal of petitioner from office.
Baltimore Law Review
discipline process is concerned with a person's ability to serve as
judge and with public confidence in the judicial process. Both of
these factors are affected by a judge's conduct, whether it occurs
on or off the bench and before or after the assumption of judicial
office. Although the sanction to be imposed may be affected by
when the conduct occurred, the power of the disciplinary body to
scrutinize such conduct is not affected.
This approach would appear to be sound in view of the pur-
pose of the judicial discipline process. It must be kept in mind,
however, that the standard of conduct to which a judge may be
held should be the standard corresponding to the status or posi-
tion that he held at the time of the acts under review. Thus, a
judge who is alleged to have engaged in improper conduct while a
lawyer must be judged by the standard of conduct then applicable
to lawyers and not the standard applicable to judges. To do other-
wise would put future judges in the impossible position of having
to comply with standards of conduct for positions they do not yet
hold and in fact may never hold. Similarly, when higher standards
of conduct for judges are adopted, a judge's conduct should be
measured against the standard in effect when the conduct oc-
curred rather than the standard in effect at the time of the
disciplinary proceeding. s1
Some judges may claim that they are being held to standards
so vague and arbitrary that they can never be certain whether any
particular act involves the appearance of impropriety, is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice, or brings the judicial office
into disrepute. To a limited degree this may be true, but general
standards are not of themselves improper or unenforceable and
are certainly not unconstitutional. 132 It would be unreasonable to
expect a code of judicial conduct to contain an exhaustive list of
narrow prohibitions that would provide the exclusive basis for
judicial discipline. At the same time, neither state judicial disci-
pline agencies nor state courts have shown any desire to serve as
grand inquisitors, examining every aspect of a judge's personal
life in the hope of finding some weakness or misconduct. Most
judges have no difficulty in acting within appropriate, albeit unde-
lineated bounds, both on and off the bench. The somewhat vague
and flexible standards of judicial conduct, therefore, pose no
threat to the vast majority of judges.
131. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 181 (Fla. 1978); In re Lit-
tell, 260 Ind. 187, 197, 294 N.E.2d 126, 131 (1973); cf In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485,
497, 294 N.W.2d 485, 491 (1980) (respondent's conduct was prohibited at time it was
engaged in; only issue was authority of court to discipline respondent on basis of that
conduct).
132. Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (D.D.C. 1977); Keiser v. Bell, 332 F.





A system of judicial discipline separate from the traditional
methods of impeachment and address is operative today in all
state judicial systems and the federal system. While there is no
question that judges are subject to discipline for official miscon-
duct, judges have also been disciplined for personal, nonofficial
conduct in a substantial number of jurisdictions. The ultimate
basis for subjecting a judge to discipline for nonofficial conduct is
the same as that for official conduct - to maintain public confi-
dence in the judiciary and the judicial process.
The administration of a system of discipline for judges is not
without its problems. It is not always clear exactly what types of
specific conduct will merit the invocation of punishment because
most of the decisions rendered in this area of the law have in-
volved a combination of various forms of misconduct. It is there-
fore unclear which types of conduct standing alone will constitute
a punishable offense.
Another problem with the administration of a disciplinary
system for judges is the lack of any empirical or statistical data to
support the inference adopted by courts that misconduct on the
part of judges brings the judicial office into disrepute or interferes
with the administration of justice. It sometimes appears as if par-
ticular courts have merely imposed their own moral standards of
what is or is not proper conduct. Those who administer judicial
discipline should keep in mind that they are not empowered to
enforce their personal views of proper conduct for judges and that
the sole purpose of judicial discipline and of restrictions on the
nonofficial activities of judges is to preserve public confidence in
the judicial system. Courts should strive to develop a more objec-
tive standard or test, which will lend itself to consistent and just
application and at the same time provide adequate warning to the




CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT*
CANON 1
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The
provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that
objective.
CANON 2
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All His Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should con-
duct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships
to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should
he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a
character witness.
Commentary: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irre-
sponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impro-
priety and appearance of impropriety. He must expect to be the subject
of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly.
The testimony of a judge as a character witness injects the prestige
of his office into the proceeding in which he testifies and may be misun-
derstood to be an official testimonial. This Canon, however, does not
afford him a privilege against testifying in response to an official
summons.
CANON 3
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office
Impartially and Diligently
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activ-
ities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by
law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
A. ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.
*Excerpted from Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct,
August, 1980, copyright 1981 by the National Center for Professional Responsibility and
the American Bar Association.
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(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public
clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before
him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official
capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff,
court officials, and others subject to his direction and control.
Commentary: The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with pa-
tience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the busi-
ness of the court. Courts can be efficient and business-like while being
patient and deliberate.
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in
a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and,
except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or
other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A
judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the
law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties
of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the
parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
Commentary: The proscription against communications concerning a
proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and
other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the
limited extent permitted. It does not preclude a judge from consulting
with other judges, or with court personnel whose function is to aid the
judge in carrying out his adjudicative responsibilities.
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain
the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite him to file a
brief amicus curiae.
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
Commentary: Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a
judge to devote adequate time to his duties, to be punctual in attending
court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to
insist that court officials, litigants and their lawyers cooperate with him
to that end.
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention
on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and control. This
subsection does not prohibit judges from making public statements in
the course of their official duties or from explaining for public informa-
tion the procedures of the court.
Commentary: "Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a
proceeding before a judge. The conduct of lawyers is governed by
DR7-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or
taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent
thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that
a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of
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evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial
administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of inves-
titive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or
recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording
and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding
has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes
in educational institutions.
Commentary: Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential
to the fair administration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a
proceeding should not distort or dramatize the proceeding.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsi-
bilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other
judges and court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence
that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may become aware.
Commentary: Disciplinary measures may include reporting a
lawyer's misconduct to an appropriate disciplinary body.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding
nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation of ap-
pointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
Commentary: Appointees of the judge include officials such as
referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers, guardians and per-
sonnel such as clerks, secretaries, and bailiffs. Consent by the parties to
an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge
of the obligation prescribed by this subsection.
C. DISQUALIFICATION.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning it;
Commentary: A lawyer in a governmental agency does not neces-
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sarily have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency
within the meaning of this subsection; a judge formerly employed by a
governmental agency, however, should disqualify himself in a proceeding
if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of such associ-
ation.
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the sub-
ject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
Commentary: The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with
a law firm with which a lawyer-relative of the judge is affiliated does not
of itself disqualify the judge. Under appropriate circumstances, the fact
that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" under Canon
3C(1), or that the lawyer-relative is known by the judge to have an inter-
est in the law firm that could be "substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding" under Canon 3C(1) (d) (iii) may require his disqualifica-
tion.
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding;
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about
the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing
in his household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
Commentary: According to the civil law system, the third degree of
relationship test would, for example, disqualify the judge if his or his
spouse's father, grandfather, uncle, brother, or niece's husband were a
party or lawyer in the proceeding, but would not disqualify him if a
cousin were a party or lawyer in the proceeding.
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administra-
tor, trustee, and guardian;
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable inter-
est, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds
securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge
participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organi-
zation;
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance
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company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar pro-
prietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the
outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in
the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect
the value of the securities.
D. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION.
A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(1) (c) or Canon 3C(1)
(d) may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the rec-
ord the basis of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the par-
ties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in
writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial
interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may par-
ticipate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and
lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
Commentary: This procedure is designed to minimize the chance that
a party or lawyer will feel coerced into an agreement. When a party is not
immediately available, the judge without violating this section may pro-
ceed on the written assurance of the lawyer that his party's consent will
be subsequently filed.
CANON 4
A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law,
the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may
engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not
cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come
before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activ-
ities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of jus-
tice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legisla-
tive body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult with an
executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning
the administration of justice.
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization
or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice. He may assist such an organiza-
tion in raising funds and may participate in their management and
investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising
activities. He may make recommendations to public and private fund-
granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice.
Commentary: As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the
law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including
revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal
and juvenile justice. To the extent that his time permits, he is encouraged
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to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial con-
ference, or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.
Extra-judicial activities are governed by Canon 5.
CANON 5
A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities to
Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties
A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, and
speak on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other
social and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not
detract from the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of
his judicial duties.
Commentary: Complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial
activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not become isolated from
the society in which he lives.
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic
and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impar-
tiality or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties. A judge
may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educa-
tional, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted
for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the fol-
lowing limitations:
(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be
engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him or will be
regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
Commentary: The changing nature of some organizations and of
their relationship to the law makes it necessary for a judge regularly to
reexamine the activities of each organization with which he is affiliated to
determine if it is proper for him to continue his relationship with it. For
example, in many jurisdictions charitable hospitals are now more fre-
quently in court than in the past. Similarly, the boards of some legal aid
organizations now make policy decisions that may have political signifi-
cance or imply commitment to causes that may come before the courts
for adjudication.
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use of the
prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed as an officer,
director, or trustee of such an organization. He should not be a speaker or
the guest of honor at an organization's fund raising events, but he may
attend such events.
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organiza-
tion, but he may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it
has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.
Commentary: A judge's participation in an organization devoted to
quasi-judicial activities is governed by Canon 4.
C. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper per-
formance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or involve
him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court on which he serves.
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*(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold
and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other
remunerative activity, but should not serve as an officer, director, mana-
ger, advisor, or employee of any business.
Commentary: The Effective Date of Compliance provision of this
Code qualifies this subsection with regard to a judge engaged in a family
business at the time this Code becomes effective.
Canon 5 may cause temporary hardship in jurisdictions where
judicial salaries are inadequate and judges are presently supplementing
their income through commercial activities. The remedy, however, is to
secure adequate judicial salaries.
[Canon 5C(2) sets the minimum standard to which a full-time judge
should adhere. Jurisdictions that do not provide adequate judicial
salaries but are willing to allow full-time judges to supplement their
incomes through commercial activities may adopt the following substi-
tute until such time as adequate salaries are provided:
*(2) Subject to the requirement of subsection (1), a judge may hold
and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other
remunerative activity including the operation of a business.
Jurisdictions adopting the foregoing substitute may also wish to pro-
hibit a judge from engaging in certain types of businesses such as that of
banks, public utilities, insurance companies, and other businesses
affected with a public interest.]
(3) A judge should manage his investments and other financial inter-
ests to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. As soon
as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he should divest him-
self of investments and other financial interests that might require fre-
quent disqualification.
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his house-
hold should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as
follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to public testimonial to him;
books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use; or
an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function
or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice;
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may
accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a
relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution
in its regular course of business on the same terms generally available to
persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the
same terms applied to other applicants;
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may
accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a
party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come
before him, and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the same
manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C.
Commentary: This subsection does not apply to contributions to a
judge's campaign for judicial office, a matter governed by Canon 7.
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in
his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a
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person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides in his
household.
(6) A judge is not required by this Code to disclose his income, debts,
or investments, except as provided in this Canon and Canons 3 and 6.
Commentary: Canon 3 requires a judge to disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which he has a financial interest, however small; Canon 5
requires a judge to refrain from engaging in business and from financial
activities that might interfere with the impartial performance of his judi-
cial duties; Canon 6 requires him to report all compensation he receives
for activities outside his judicial office. A judge has the right of an ordi-
nary citizen, including the right to privacy of his financial affairs, except
to the extent that limitations thereon are required to safeguard the
proper performance of his duties. Owning and receiving income from
investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge's duties.
(7) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should
not be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other pur-
pose not related to his judicial duties.
D. Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate,
trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service
will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.
"Member of his family" includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a
close familial relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to the
following restrictions:
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be
engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him, or if the
estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the
court on which he serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.
Commentary: The Effective Date of Compliance provision of this
Code qualifies this subsection with regard to a judge who is an executor,
administrator, trustee, or other fiduciary at the time this Code becomes
effective.
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject to the same restric-
tions on financial activities that apply to him in his personal capacity.
Commentary: A judge's obligation under this Canon and his obliga-
tion as a fiduciary may come into conflict. For example, a judge should
resign as trustee if it would result in detriment to the trust to divest it of
holdings whose retention would place the judge in violation of Canon
5C(3).
E. Arbitration. A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator.
F. Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law.
G. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept ap-
pointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position
that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the
improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of jus-
tice. A judge, however, may represent his country, state, or locality on
ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and
cultural activities.
Commentary: Valuable services have been rendered in the past to the
states and the nation by judges appointed by the executive to undertake
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important extra-judicial assignments. The appropriateness of conferring
these assignments on judges must be reassessed, however, in light of the
demands on judicial manpower created by today's crowded dockets and
the need to protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial matters
that may prove to be controversial. Judges should not be expected or per-
mitted to accept governmental appointments that could interfere with
the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.
CANON 6
A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation
Received for Quasi-Judicial and Extra-Judicial Activities
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses
for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code,
if the source of such payments does not give the appearance of influenc-
ing the judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of
impropriety, subject to the following restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable
amount nor should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would
receive for the same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be
limited to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred
by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any
payment in excess of such an amount is compensation.
C. Public Reports. A judge should report the date, place, and nature
of any activity for which he received compensation, and the name of the
payor and the amount of compensation so received. Compensation or
income of a spouse attributed to the judge by operation of a community
property law is not extra-judicial compensation to the judge. His report
should be made at least annually and should be filed as a public document
in the office of the clerk of the court on which he serves or other office
designated by rule of court.
CANON 7
A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity
Inappropriate to His Judicial Office
A. POLITICAL CONDUCT IN GENERAL.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(b) make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly
endorse a candidate for public office;
Commentary: A candidate does not publicly endorse another candi-
date for public office by having his name on the same ticket.
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a
political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or pur-
chase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions, except as
authorized in subsection A(2);
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between com-
peting candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as per-
mitted by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on
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his own behalf when he is a candidate for election or re-election, identify
himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to a political
party or organization.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate
either in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office,
except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a candi-
date for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional con-
vention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the adminis-
tration of justice.
B. CAMPAIGN CONDUCT.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
that is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on
the basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and
should encourage members of his family to adhere to the same standards
of political conduct that apply to him;
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direc-
tion or control from doing for him what he is prohibited from doing under
this Canon; and except to the extent authorized under subsection B(2) or
B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for him what he is pro-
hibited from doing under this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
that is filled by public election between competing candidates should not
himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated sup-
port, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to secure
and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain pub-
lic statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not pro-
hibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from
lawyers. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for his campaign no
earlier than [901 days before a primary election and no later than [90] days
after the last election in which he participates during the election year. A
candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for
the private benefit of himself or members of his family.
Commentary: Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of
his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the can-
didate.
[Each jurisdiction adopting this Code should prescribe a time limit
on soliciting campaign funds that is appropriate to the elective process
therein.]
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-
election to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy
has drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may
obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in the manner pro-
vided in subsection B(2).
1981]
Baltimore Law Review
Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial sys-
tem performing judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee in
bankruptcy, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, is a
judge for the purpose of this Code. All judges should comply with this
Code except as provided below.
A. Part-time Judge. A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a
continuing or periodic basis, but is permitted by law to devote time to
some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for that
reason is less than that of a full-time judge. A part-time judge:
(1) is not required to comply with Canon 5C(2), D, E, F, and G, and
Canon 6C;
(2) should not practice law in the court on which he serves or in any
court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court on which he serves,
or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he has served as a judge or in
any other proceeding related thereto.
B. Judge Pro Tempore. A judge pro tempore is a person who is
appointed to act temporarily as a judge.
(1) While acting as such, a judge pro tempore is not required to com-
ply with Canon 5C(2), (3), D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C.
(2) A person who has been a judge pro tempore should not act as a
lawyer in a proceeding in which he has served as a judge or in any other
proceeding related thereto.
C. Retired Judge. A retired judge who receives the same compensa-
tion as a full-time judge on the court from which he retired and is eligible
for recall to judicial service should comply with all the provisions of this
Code except Canon 5G, but he should refrain from judicial service during
the period of an extra-judicial appointment not sanctioned by Canon 5G.
All other retired judges eligible for recall to judicial service should com-
ply with the provisions of this Code governing part-time judges.
Effective Date of Compliance
A person to whom this Code becomes applicable should arrange his
affairs as soon as reasonably possible to comply with it. If, however, the
demands on his time and the possibility of conflicts of interest are not
substantial, a person who holds judicial office on the date this Code
becomes effective may:
(a) continue to act as an officer, director, or non-legal advisor of a
family business;
(b) continue to act as an executor, administrator, trustee, or other
fiduciary for the estate or person of one who is not a member of his
family.
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